Given the emergence of some beings, there necessarily must exist a being that brought those contingent beings into existence. This creator is God.
God: the necessary being.
The proof for the existence of God is called Burhan Al-Huduth (“the Proof of Emergence”). It can be expressed in the following manner:
- If emergent beings exist, then a necessary being exists.
- Emergent beings exist.
- Therefore, a necessary being exists.
Proving the conclusion is proof for the existence of God. Since a necessary being is what we intended when we say “God”.
Premise 1: If emergent beings exist, then a necessary being exists
The first premise proposes that we can deduce the existence of a necessary being, by realizing the existence of emergent beings.
This premise is true, because the set of all emergent beings is emergent, which necessitates the existence of an extrinsic specifier to have brought this set into existence. The extrinsic specifier cannot itself be emergent, otherwise it would belong to the set of all emergent begins. This extrinsic specifier is therefore, a beginningless being. And a beginningless being is a necessary being.
The set of all emergent beings is emergent, because each emergent being in this set is an event. And it is impossible for an infinite number of events to have emerged into existence in the past.
Premise 2: Emergent beings exist
In the previous article, we proved that bodies are emergent beings by way of Burhan Huduth Al-Ajsam. And the existence of bodies is known by observation.
Therefore, a necessary being exists
Since the two premises are true, the conclusion necessarily follows. Therefore, a necessary being exists. And since a “necessary being” is what we intend when we say “God”, God exists.
 In summary: the existence of an emergent being is preceded by its non-existence, which means that its existence accepts both affirmation and negation. The existence of this essence is therefore contingent upon an extrinsic specifier to have specified existence for it over non-existence. More on this here.
 If the extrinsic specifier were part of the set of all emergent beings, this would make the extrinsic specifier non-extrinsic, which is impossible.
 The existence of a being is either necessary or contingent.
If the existence of the being is contingent, then it must have been brought into existence by an extrinsic specifier. Since a beginningless being cannot be “brought” into existence, a beginningless being is not contingent. And since a beginningless being is not contingent, it must therefore be necessary.
 As that would entail Tasalsul, which is impossible.